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Abstract
We analyze how the rise of institutional investors has transformed
the governance landscape. While corporate ownership is now concentrated
in the hands of institutional investors that can exercise stewardship of those
corporations that would be impossible for dispersed shareholders, the
investment managers of these institutional investors have agency problems
vis-à-vis their own investors. We develop an analytical framework for
examining these agency problems and apply it to study several key types of
investment managers.
We analyze how the investment managers of mutual funds - both
index funds and actively managed funds - have incentives to underspend on
stewardship and to side excessively with managers of corporations. We
show that these incentives are especially acute for managers of index funds,
and that the rise of such funds has system-wide adverse consequences for
corporate governance. Activist hedge funds have substantially better
incentives than managers of index funds or active mutual funds, but their
activities do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of
institutional investors.
Our analysis provides a framework for future work on institutional
investors and their agency problems, and generates insights on a wide range
of policy questions. We discuss implications for disclosure by institutional
investors; regulation of their fees; stewardship codes; the rise of index
investing; proxy advisors; hedge funds; wolf pack activism; and the
allocation of power between corporate managers and shareholders.

JEL Classification: G23; G34; K22
Keywords: Institutional investors, investment managers, mutual funds,
index funds, hedge fund activism, stewardship

Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 31, Number 3—Summer 2017—Pages 89–112

The Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst

F

inancial economics and corporate governance have long focused on the
agency problems between corporate managers and shareholders that
result from the dispersion of ownership in large publicly traded corporations. In this paper, we focus on how the rise of institutional investors over the
past several decades has transformed the corporate landscape and, in turn,
the governance problems of the modern corporation. The rise of institutional
investors has led to increased concentration of equity ownership, with most
public corporations now having a substantial proportion of their shares held by
a small number of institutional investors. At the same time, these institutions
are controlled by investment managers, which have their own agency problems
vis-à-vis their own beneficial investors. These agency problems are the focus of
our analysis.
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We develop an analytical framework for understanding the agency problems of institutional investors. We apply this framework to examine the agency problems and behavior of several key types of investment managers, including those that
manage mutual funds—both index funds and actively managed funds—and activist
hedge funds.
We identify several drivers of agency problems that afflict the decisions of investment managers of either passive index funds, active mutual funds, or both. First,
such investment managers generally capture only a small fraction of the benefits that
results from their stewardship activities while bearing the full cost of such activities.
Further, competition with other investment managers is typically insufficient to eliminate these agency problems. Finally, investment managers may be further influenced
by private incentives, such as their interest in obtaining business from corporations,
that encourage them to side excessively with managers of corporations.
We show that index funds have especially poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and increase value. Accordingly, while
the rise of index funds benefits investors and the economy by reducing the costs of
financial intermediation, this trend also has systemwide adverse consequences on
governance.
Activist hedge funds have substantially better incentives than managers of
index funds or active mutual funds. While their activities may partially compensate,
we show that they do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of
other institutional investors.
We recognize that well-meaning investment managers of index funds and
active mutual funds may sometimes make stewardship decisions that are superior to
those suggested purely by their incentive calculus. Our focus, however, is on understanding the structural incentive problems that should be recognized in assessing
the current governance landscape.
There is a growing recognition by researchers, capital market participants,
and public officials that investment fund managers are imperfect agents for
those investing in their funds, and there is now significant literature on this
problem. Our analytical framework contributes by identifying the direction and
manner in which the behavior of investment fund managers can be expected to
deviate from the interests of their beneficial investors. For example, by demonstrating that the agency problems of institutional investors can be expected to
lead them to underinvest in stewardship and side excessively with corporate
managers, we show that concerns about the existence of such agency problems
provide little basis for weakening shareholder rights or impeding shareholder
action.
Furthermore, our analysis also generates insights on a wide range of policy
questions and provides a framework for future work. We conclude by offering implications in a number of areas: disclosure by institutional investors and regulation of
their fees; stewardship codes; the rise of index investing; proxy advisors; hedge fund
and wolf pack activism; the allocation of power between corporate managers and
shareholders; and others.
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The Rise of Institutional Investors
In their classic work on the separation of ownership and control, Berle and
Means (1932) introduced the problem of publicly traded companies with widely
dispersed ownership. In such situations, Berle and Means explained that, “[a]s his
personal vote will count for little or nothing at the meeting … the stockholder is
practically reduced to the alternative of not voting at all or else of handing over his
vote” to the proxy committee, appointed by existing management, who can “virtually dictate their own successors” (p. 87). Because dispersed shareholders can thus
be expected to be rationally apathetic, managers will be relatively unconstrained
in their actions, which Berle and Means refer to as “management control” of the
corporation.
Furthermore, Berle and Means (1932) documented that a significant proportion of publicly traded corporations have a sufficiently broad dispersion of
shareholders to be classified as management-controlled. For example, Berle and
Means (pp. 107–109, table XII, panel G) show that, of the largest 200 corporations
in 1930 that they listed as being controlled by hired managers (rather than run
directly by owners), the aggregate percentage of the corporation’s equity owned by
the corporation’s largest 20 shareholders had a mean of 10.55 percent (median of
10.6 percent).
Some classic articles by financial economists, following Berle and Means
(1932), assume that shareholders of publicly traded firms are “atomistic” and have
no incentive to seek governance improvements in the firms in which they own
shares (for example, Grossman and Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Given the
practical infeasibility of such shareholder activities in the Berle–Means corporation,
some researchers have focused on how other mechanisms, such as the discipline
of the market for corporate control (Manne 1965), stock ownership by managers
(Demsetz 1983), or price pressure due to sale of shares by investors seeking to exit
underperforming companies (Admati and Pfleiderer 2009) could constrain the
agency problems of managers and thereby make up for the lack of direct shareholder effort to improve governance.
Berle and Means (1932, p. 47) argued that “[d]ispersion in the ownership of
separate enterprises appears to be inherent in the corporate system. It has already
proceeded far, it is rapidly increasing, and appears to be an inevitable development.” However, the trend toward dispersion has been reversed in subsequent
decades by the rise of institutional investors. The rise of institutional investors
has been driven by investor recognition of the value of low-cost diversification
and encouraged by favorable regulatory and tax treatment. Whereas institutional
investors held 6.1 percent of outstanding corporate equity in 1950 (Tonello and
Rabimov 2010), they held 63 percent of outstanding public corporate equity in
2016 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2016, p. 130). Furthermore, because institutional investors aggregate the assets of a vast number of
individuals, each institutional investor can hold large positions in many publicly
traded companies.
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Table 1
Institutional Ownership of the 20 Largest US Corporations
Percentage owned by largest holders
Corporation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Apple Inc.
Microsoft Corp.
Exxon Mobil Corp.
Johnson & Johnson
General Electric Co.
AT&T Inc.
Wells Fargo & Co.
Verizon Communications Inc.
Procter & Gamble Co.
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Pfizer Inc.
Chevron Corp.
Coca-Cola Co.
Visa Inc.
Home Depot Inc.
Disney (Walt) Co.
Merck & Co.
Philip Morris International
Intel Corp.
Cisco Systems Inc.

Mean
Median

Largest 5

Largest 20

Largest 50

17.5%
20.5%
17.8%
19.0%
17.5%
19.0%
24.9%
20.1%
18.4%
19.5%
18.7%
21.6%
26.6%
23.8%
24.4%
17.9%
26.1%
24.8%
20.2%
18.8%

26.8%
33.1%
27.1%
30.3%
28.0%
28.8%
40.2%
32.9%
28.3%
34.7%
32.1%
33.9%
39.9%
41.7%
37.4%
29.6%
38.4%
40.9%
32.9%
32.2%

35.4%
43.2%
35.2%
40.5%
37.3%
37.4%
51.0%
43.7%
38.2%
47.1%
45.1%
43.6%
48.6%
56.3%
49.1%
39.1%
50.1%
52.1%
44.6%
45.7%

20.8%
19.8%

33.4%
32.9%

44.2%
44.2%

Source: FactSet Ownership database (by FactSet Research Systems).
Note: The table shows the aggregate ownership of the largest holders of the largest 20 US
corporations by market capitalization as of June 30, 2016, excluding controlled corporations.

As a result of the rise of institutional investors, the scenario of dispersed ownership described by Berle and Means (1932) no longer approximates reality, not even
for the largest publicly traded corporations. Table 1 lists the largest 20 US corporations by market capitalization as of June 30, 2016 (excluding controlled corporations),
and the aggregate percentage of the stock of each corporation owned by their largest
5, 20, and 50 institutional investors.1
As Table 1 shows, current share ownership is significantly more concentrated
than the level described by Berle and Means (1932). Indeed, because the figures in
Table 1 exclude large holdings by noninstitutional investors, they likely underestimate the degree to which shares are concentrated among investors with significant
holdings. Even among the largest 20 corporations, the largest 20 institutional

1

Investment advisers that manage multiple mutual funds generally have corporate governance staff that
cast votes in the same way for each fund and undertake stewardship on behalf of each fund. Accordingly,
for the purposes of these calculations, we group the shareholdings of the mutual funds managed by each
investment manager as a single “institutional investor.”
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investors in 2016 had mean ownership of 33.4 percent (and similar median
ownership of 32.9 percent), more than three times the figure reported by Berle
and Means (1932); in each of the 20 corporations, the largest 20 institutional
investors own more than 25 percent. Furthermore, among these very large public
corporations, the percentage owned by the largest 50 institutional investors
has a mean of 44.2 percent (the median is also 44.2 percent). The increase in
concentration is perhaps most vivid when looking at the aggregate percentage
owned by the largest five shareholders, which has a mean of 20.8 percent
(median of 19.8 percent) and is above 17 percent in each of the 20 largest US
corporations.
Data from ISS Voting Analytics shows that the mean percentage of shares
outstanding voted at the 2015 annual meetings of these corporations for the
election of directors was 68.7 percent (median of 70.8 percent). The largest
50 institutional investors thus cast a substantial majority of the votes at these
annual meetings.
Thus, large institutional shareholders hold sufficiently sizable positions in
each large corporation to have a non-negligible effect on the outcomes of shareholder votes. Moreover, these shareholders recognize that many of their fellow
shareholders are similarly non-atomistic. Of course, because the benefits of each
shareholder’s actions will be shared with fellow shareholders, it will still be privately
optimal for each shareholder to underspend on stewardship. However, given the
current concentrated ownership of publicly traded corporations, if each shareholder
were solely investing its own money, it would no longer be rational for all shareholders to be rationally apathetic. On the contrary, given that some stewardship
involves limited costs and can generate significant increases in value, it is likely to
be privately optimal for some shareholders with significant holdings to undertake
such activities.
As a result of these changes, the prospects for stewardship by shareholders are
substantially better today than in Berle–Means corporations. Institutional investors
participate in corporate voting, and there is empirical evidence that the presence
of institutional investors influences how corporations are governed (for example,
Hartzell and Starks 2003; Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales 2013). Institutional
investors therefore provide constraints on agency problems in their portfolio
companies that dispersed shareholders in Berle–Means corporations were unable
to accomplish.
However, investment managers invest other people’s money. Thus, the
question arises whether their stewardship decisions would be the same as those
that they would make if they were solely investing their own money. Below we
analyze the agency problems that could lead these investment managers to
deviate from the stewardship decisions that would be optimal for their beneficial investors. These agency problems limit the extent to which our corporate
governance system is able to benefit from the increased concentration of shareholdings, and are a key impediment to improving the governance of publicly traded
corporations.
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Stewardship by Investment Managers
Investment Funds, Active and Passive
By investment funds we refer to funds that pool together the assets of many
individuals and entities and invest them in a diversified portfolio of securities. The
category of investment funds includes open-end mutual funds, closed-end mutual
funds, exchange-traded funds, and other similar funds. Most of these investment
funds are technically “investment companies,” as defined and regulated by the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Given our emphasis on corporate governance,
we naturally focus on funds that invest in equity securities. Investment funds are the
most important category of institutional investors and represent most of the assets
held by institutional investors.
Investment funds generally enter into contracts with organizations, referred
to in US securities regulations as “investment advisers,” to manage the porfolios of investment funds. We will refer to these organizations as “investment
managers.”
Investment funds focusing on equity securities can be categorized by their
investing strategy into those that actively manage their portfolio and those that
passively invest by matching their portfolio weightings of corporations to those of an
underlying equity index. We refer to the latter, which include both open-end mutual
funds and exchange-traded funds, as index funds. Most mutual fund managers
operate a number of mutual funds, often referred to collectively as a “mutual fund
family.” While most mutual fund families include both actively managed funds and
index funds, mutual fund families predominantly operate one or the other kind of
investment fund.
The index fund market is dominated by three investment managers: BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors (sometimes referred to as the
“Big Three”). These investment managers have assets under management of $3.1
trillion, $2.5 trillion, and $1.9 trillion, respectively (Diamond 2016). The largest
investment managers of actively managed funds include Fidelity Investments
and the Capital Group, both of which have more than $1 trillion in assets under
management.
We pay particular attention to index funds because their share of the market
for managed investments has increased significantly in recent years, a trend that
is expected to continue. The move towards index funds is driven by the growing
recognition of their low costs and tax advantages, and the evidence that they outperform most actively managed equity mutual funds (French 2008). Passively managed
funds increased from 1 percent of total fund assets in 1984 to 12.6 percent in 2006
(French 2008), and the move from active to passive funds has continued since
then. From 2013 to 2016, investors added $1.3 trillion to passive mutual funds and
exchange-traded funds (Tergesen and Zweig 2016).
The rise of index investing has benefits in reducing the costs of intermediation borne by investors; as of the end of 2015, the asset-weighted average
net expense ratio was only 0.12 percent for US equity index funds, compared
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to 0.79 percent for actively managed US equity funds (Oey and West 2016,
p. 6). We recognize this benefit to investors, but wish to stress a systemic cost
of index funds. As we discuss below, while agency problems afflict the stewardship activities of all investment funds, they are likely to be especially acute for
index funds.
Stewardship
Our focus is on those decisions of investment managers that relate to the stewardship of companies in their portfolio. Stewardship by investment managers can
take several forms. Most investment funds are required to vote at shareholder meetings on director elections and management and shareholder proposals, and to have
an internal process for making voting decisions. Thus, not voting, or voting in a
patently uninformed manner, is not an option for investment managers. Stewardship therefore requires monitoring of corporate managers and other information
gathering in order to inform voting, engagement, and other stewardship activities. Investment managers can nominate candidates for election as directors or put
forward shareholder proposals, and they can communicate with the corporation,
or with other shareholders, about such matters. While stewardship may also relate
to environmental and social matters that affect investors (for example, Hirst 2016),
our focus in this paper is on stewardship decisions that affect beneficial investors
only through their effect on the financial value of the managed portfolio.
Stewardship decisions can be split into two parts: 1) spending decisions
regarding how much to expend on stewardship; and 2) qualitative decisions
regarding which way to vote or which positions to take in communications with
corporate managers and other shareholders.
Like all organizations with multiple employees, investment managers have
their own internal agency problems. Our analysis can be thought of as analyzing the
incentives that would shape the stewardship strategies that the leaders of investment
managers would pursue, for example, choices regarding the resources to provide
for corporate governance and proxy voting units and setting the general policy and
approach of such units.
Because the voting and stewardship decisions of mutual fund families are
commonly concentrated in a single corporate governance department or proxy
voting department of the investment manager, the stewardship incentives of investment managers with different types of funds are a composite of the different
incentives we identify below for the different types of investment funds.

Sources of Agency Problems
The Benchmark Scenario: Decisions that Maximize Portfolio Value
Let us consider a hypothetical scenario with no agency problems in managing
such investments. For instance, imagine that each of the positions were those of
sole owners that owned and managed 100 percent of each investment. In this case,
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the decisions made would be ones that maximize the value of the owners’ wealth.
More specifically, suppose that some stewardship activity will cost C and will increase
the value of the position by ΔV. Then, in the benchmark, no-agency scenario, the
stewardship activity will be undertaken if C < ΔV.2
For large equity positions, like those that investment managers hold in many
companies, the no-agency-costs scenario would often justify meaningful investments in stewardship activities. If an investor had a $1 billion investment in a given
portfolio company, and investment in certain stewardship activities would increase
the value of the company by 0.1 percent, then the investor would have an incentive to spend up to $1 million on stewardship to bring about this change. We note
that each large mutual fund family holds positions exceeding $1 billion in value
in a large number of public companies; data from the FactSet Ownership database shows that, as of December 31, 2016, BlackRock, Capital Research, Fidelity,
State Street Global Advisors, and Vanguard each held such positions at a substantial
proportion of corporations in the S&P 500 index.
In many cases, stewardship decisions may be merely qualitative, and not involve
additional cost. This is commonly the case when investment managers decide how
to cast a vote or what position to take in interactions with corporate managers or
fellow shareholders. Suppose that voting or otherwise taking a position against the
outcome management prefers would change the value of the position by ΔV, where
ΔV can be positive or negative. In such a case, in the no-agency-cost benchmark
scenario, the investor should make a choice against managers’ preferences whenever ΔV is positive.
Capturing Only a Small Fraction of the Benefit
We now turn to the decisions that the investment manager would find privately
optimal. Although we will later relax these assumptions, we will initially take as
given the size of fees charged by investment managers and the size of the portfolio
managed.
One key source of agency problems is that investment managers bear the costs
of stewardship activities, but capture only a small fraction of the benefits they create.
Under existing regulations governing mutual funds, investment managers cannot
charge their personnel and other management expenses directly to the portfolio.
For example, if an investment manager were to employ staff fully dedicated to
stewardship of a single corporation, or if an investment manager were to conduct
a proxy fight in opposition to incumbent managers, it would have to cover those
expenses itself, out of the fee income it receives from investors.
At the same time, the benefits from stewardship flow to the portfolio. Mutual
fund managers and investment managers of other similarly structured funds are not
permitted to collect incentive fees on increases in the value of their portfolio but
2
In developing our analytical framework, we draw upon the model in Bebchuk and Neeman (2010), which
explains how the decisions that institutional investors make with respect to lobbying regarding investor
protection levels differ from the decisions that would be optimal for the beneficial investors in those funds.
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may only charge fees that are calculated as a percentage of assets under management. Let α be the fraction of assets under management that an investment
manager charges as fees. Therefore, α is also fraction of the increase in the value
of a portfolio company that an investment fund will be able to capture, in present
value terms, from additional fees. The value of α is likely to be small given that the
asset-weighted average net expense ratio for US equity index funds was 0.12 percent
as of December 31, 2015 (Oey and West 2016). It would not be in the interests of
the investment manager to spend an amount C that would produce a gain of ΔV
to the portfolio if C is larger than α × ΔV. Thus, in this setting, agency problems
would lead to underspending on stewardship, precluding efficient expenditure,
whenever:
α × ΔV < C < ΔV
To illustrate this wedge, reconsider the example above of an investment
manager of an index fund that holds a $1 billion investment in a portfolio company
whose value could increase by $1 million as a result of certain stewardship activities.
If the investment manager could expect additional fees with a present value of 0.12
percent from the changes in the value of the position, it would be willing to take
such actions only if their cost was below $1,200, compared to $1 million in the
no-agency-costs scenario.
Although investment managers of actively managed funds charge higher fees,
because those fees are still a very small fraction of the investment, they will have only
slightly higher incentives to spend on stewardship. If such an investment manager
received additional fees of 0.79 percent of the change in the value of the position—
the asset-weighted average net expense ratio for actively-managed US equity mutual
funds as of December 31, 2015 (Oey and West 2016)—then it would be willing
to take such actions only if their cost was below $7,900. Thus, managers of active
mutual funds still have strong incentives to spend much less on stewardship than
would be value-maximizing for their portfolio.
The Limits of Competition: Index Funds
Thus far, our analysis has assumed that investment managers take their fees and
assets under management as given when making stewardship decisions. By relaxing
this assumption, we now consider whether the desire to improve performance and
attract additional funds might counter the distortions identified above and lead
investment managers to make additional investments in stewardship that would be
portfolio-value-maximizing.
In examining this question, it is important to recognize that what matters for
attracting assets under management (and thereby increasing future fee revenue)
is not the absolute performance of the investment manager, but its performance
relative to alternative investment opportunities. Potential investors in equity mutual
funds can be expected to judge the investment manager’s performance relative to
an equity index, or relative to other comparable equity mutual funds. As a result, in
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many cases, the consideration of improving relative performance would not provide
any incentives to improve stewardship decisions.
In particular, this is the situation in the important case of the investment
managers of passively managed index mutual funds. If the investment manager of
a certain mutual fund that invests according to a given index increases its spending
on stewardship at a particular portfolio company and thereby increases the value
of its investment in that company, it will also increase the value of the index, so its
expenditure would not lead to any increase in the performance of the mutual fund
relative to the index. Nor would it lead to any increase relative to the investment
manager’s rivals that follow the same index, as any increase in the value of the corporation would also be captured by all other mutual funds investing according to the
index, even though they had not made any additional expenditure on stewardship.
Thus, if the investment manager were to take actions that increase the value
of the portfolio company, and therefore also the portfolio that tracks the index,
doing so would not result in a superior performance that could enable the manager
to attract funds currently invested with rival investment managers. Such decisions
would also not enable the investment manager to increase fees relative to rivals
tracking the same index, as such rivals would offer the same gross return without the
increased fees. Accordingly, for managers of index funds, a desire to improve relative performance would not provide any incentives that could counter tendencies
that the investment manager might otherwise have to underspend on stewardship
and to side with corporate managers more often than is optimal for the investment
managers’ beneficial investors.
It could be argued that the inability of index funds to attract additional investors by increasing stewardship spending implies that the existing equilibrium is
optimal. However, our analysis indicates that this equilibrium is due to a collective
action problem. The beneficial investors of an index fund would be better served
by having the fund increase stewardship spending up to the level that would maximize the portfolio value, even if the fund increased its fees to fund this spending.
However, if the index fund were to raise its fees and improve its stewardship, each
individual investor in the fund would have an incentive to switch to rival index
funds. That is, a move by any given index fund manager to improve stewardship
and raise fees would unravel, because its investors would prefer to free-ride on the
investment manager’s efforts by switching to another investment fund that offers
the same indexed portfolio but without stewardship or higher fees.
The Limits of Competition: Actively Managed Funds
Turning to actively managed funds, it is important to recognize that there is
evidence that many of these funds are, to varying extents, “closet indexers” whose
holdings substantially overlap with their benchmark index, deviating only by underweighting and overweighting certain stocks (Cremers and Petajisto 2009). For an
actively managed fund that is to some extent a closet indexer, a desire to improve
relative performance would provide no incentives to move stewardship decisions toward optimality for any of the portfolio companies where the company’s
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weighting in the investment fund’s portfolio is approximately equal to its weighting
in the index; improving the value of those portfolio companies would not enhance
performance relative to the index.
Furthermore, for all the corporations that are underweight in the portfolio
relative to the index, enhancing the value of the corporation would actually worsen
the investment manager’s performance relative to the index. For corporations that
are underweight in the portfolio, the consideration of increasing relative performance does not provide any incentive to enhance the value of these corporations;
on the contrary, this consideration weighs against trying to do so.
Thus, the desire to improve relative performance could only provide an
actively managed fund with incentives to improve value in those corporations that
are overweight in the portfolio compared to the index. Even for such corporations,
the extent to which improving the value of the corporation would improve fund
performance will depend on the extent to which the corporation is overweight in
the portfolio.
Consider a portfolio company that constitutes 1 percent of the benchmark
index and 1.2 percent of the investment fund. In this case, any increase in the value
of the portfolio company will be substantially shared by rival funds that track the
index at least partly. Indeed, the increase in value of the portfolio company will
worsen the performance of the investment fund relative to rival funds that are more
overweight with respect to the portfolio company. Thus, even for companies that
are overweight within the portfolio of the investment fund relative to the index, the
impact of the desire to improve relative performance would be diluted by the presence of the company in the benchmark index and in the portfolios of rival funds.
Furthermore, as discussed above, in most cases actively managed funds are part
of mutual fund families composed of a number of mutual funds, and stewardship
decisions are commonly made for all these investment funds by the fund family’s
governance or proxy voting group. In such a case, the fact that a given actively
managed fund is overweight in a particular corporation might be offset by the fact
that other actively managed funds within the same fund family might be underweight. The investment manager of the fund family will have an incentive to bring
about an increase in value only if its actively managed funds are on the whole overweight in this corporation, and the incentive will be diluted to the extent that any
gains will be shared by other mutual fund families.
In addition, an interest in improving their relative performance might also
push investment managers in the opposite direction, and thereby exacerbate rather
than alleviate distortions in stewardship decisions. Ke, Petroni, and Yu (2008, p.
855) describe evidence that some institutional investors value “direct access to
companies’ management,” presumably because they believe that, notwithstanding
the limitations imposed by Regulation Fair Disclosure, being able to communicate with managers will improve their trading decisions. For investment managers
following active strategies, trading decisions that change the weight of a portfolio
company relative to its weighting in the index are likely to be the main determinants
of their performance relative to their benchmark index. To the extent that active
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investment managers believe that making stewardship decisions that corporate
managers disfavor might adversely affect their access to such managers, an interest
in improving relative performance could provide incentives to avoid such decisions.
Note that, to the extent that investment managers get access to corporate
managers and consequently make better trading decisions, the gains from such
trading decisions will improve the investment manager’s performance relative to
others, since rivals will not share these trading gains. By comparison, gains from
governance-generated improvements in the value of particular portfolio companies will be substantially shared with rivals. Thus, an interest in improving relative
performance could well lead active fund managers to place more weight on gains
to their portfolios from access to corporate managers relative to gains from
governance-generated increases in value, compared to what would be optimal for
the investment funds’ beneficial investors.3
Finally, without discussing the issue in detail, we want to flag a disagreement in
the literature regarding the extent to which fund inflows and outflows are sensitive
to changes in relative performance (for example, Sirri and Tufano 1998 and Coates
and Hubbard 2007). To the extent that the sensitivity of inflows and outflows to
performance is limited, competition with other investment funds will give investment managers limited incentives to improve the value of portfolio companies.
The Governance Passivity of Investment Funds
The above analysis suggests that investment managers, those managing both
passive index funds and active mutual funds, have incentives to be “more passive”
with respect to governance issues than is optimal for their beneficial investors.
With respect to index funds, our analysis is consistent with the practically negligible resources that index funds spend on stewardship beyond what is required to
comply with regulations requiring investment managers to vote shares in portfolio
companies and to avoid doing so in an uninformed fashion. Vanguard employs
about 15 staff for voting and stewardship at its 13,000 portfolio companies; BlackRock employs 24 staff for voting and stewardship at 14,000 portfolio companies; and
State Street Global Advisors employs fewer than 10 staff for voting and stewardship
at 9,000 portfolio companies (Krouse, Benoit, and McGinty 2016).
Of course, these staff may receive information from proxy advisors as well as from
active portfolio managers employed by the investment manager. However, each of
these major investment managers devotes less than one person-workday per year, on
average, to assessing this and other information, and undertaking other stewardship
activities with respect to each of their portfolio companies. Note that each of these
investment managers is likely to hold several percent of each company’s stock and
to be among their largest shareholders. Given the size and value of the positions
3

An increase in relative gross returns could be used by an investment manager not to attract additional
funds but to extract an increase in the level of fees charged without risking an outflow of funds. The
above analysis, suggesting that an interest in increasing relative performance is unlikely to induce
optimal stewardship decisions, also applies equally to this scenario.
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that each of these investment managers holds in large public companies, there are
grounds for concern that these managers substantially underinvest in stewardship.
With respect to active mutual funds, our analysis is similarly consistent with
the very limited resources that predominantly actively managed mutual fund families currently spend on stewardship. Even the largest such mutual fund families
employ only a small number of staff to make voting decisions and undertake all
other governance-related stewardship activities in the vast number of corporations
in which they hold stock.
In a companion paper, we document that this underinvestment by investment
managers is reflected not only in the limited time that their staff spend on voting and
stewardship activities, but also in the absence of these investment managers from
the ranks of investors that use certain significant tools to generate value increases
from improved governance that benefit the investment funds (Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Hirst 2017). For example, large investment managers generally avoid submitting shareholder proposals, nominating directors to the boards of corporations,
or conducting proxy contests. Their absence might be due not only to incentives
to underspend on stewardship, but also to private costs that investment managers
viewed as oppositional to managers might have to bear, which we discuss below.
Our companion paper also addresses the argument that substantial passivity on
the part of investment managers is optimal, and that the underspending problem
is therefore of limited economic importance. Such an argument could be justified
if other mechanisms—such as the discipline of the market for corporate control,
executive incentives schemes, or monitoring and engagement by other investors—could be relied on to eliminate agency problems in public companies. We
argue, however, that the limits of such mechanisms make it plausible to assume that
improved stewardship by the investment managers that hold a large proportion of
the shares of most publicly traded companies can significantly improve outcomes
for their own investors.
There is a growing recognition of the power of large investment managers,
and concomitantly increasing expectation that they will use this power to improve
the governance of their portfolio companies. The leaders of the largest index fund
managers have responded by making public announcements stressing their commitment to stewardship, and to improving corporate governance (for example, Fink
2015; McNabb 2015). These executives may indeed believe in the desirability of
governance improvements and sincerely wish to help bring them about. However,
our economic analysis indicates that investment managers may well have very limited
economic incentives to spend on stewardship, and may have economic incentives to
be more lax toward corporate managers, compared with what would be optimal for
their beneficial investors.
Private Costs from Opposing Managers
Another significant source of agency problems introduced by the separation
between investment managers and beneficial owners is that investment managers
may bear private costs from taking positions that corporate managers disfavor. When
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such private costs may result, investment managers may be more reluctant to spend
on actions or make qualitative decisions that are disfavored by corporate managers.
Suppose that such an action would result in a change in the value of the portfolio
of ΔV but a private indirect cost of IC to the investment manager. The investment
manager will take the disfavored action only if C + IC is less than α × ΔV.
For qualitative choices that would not involve any additional marginal cost but
would have an expected positive effect on the value of the portfolio (that is, ΔV > 0),
the investment manager would prefer to side with managers if IC > α × ΔV. Thus,
the investment manager would prefer to avoid taking a position disfavored by
managers that would be optimal for the managed portfolio if and only if:
IC .
0 < ΔV <  ___
α
What is important is not whether avoiding such actions actually helps investment managers obtain business, but whether investment managers believe that to
be the case, on an expected value basis. The smaller is α, the wider the range of
increases in value that the investment manager would forgo not to bear expected
indirect costs of taking actions that corporate managers disfavor. That investment
funds charge fees below 1 percent (on average) strengthens the distortion resulting
from potential indirect costs.
One important source of costs from taking positions that corporate managers
disfavor (or benefits from taking positions that managers favor) comes from
the incentives of investment managers to obtain or retain business from public
corporations. In 2015, 401(k) assets under management totaled $4.7 trillion,
with 60 percent held in mutual funds (Collins, Holden, Duvall, and Chism 2016,
p. 2); most of these assets are likely to come from public corporations. Cvijanović,
Dasgupta, and Zachariadis (2016) document that an average of 14 percent of
fund family revenue is derived from 401(k)-related business. The largest index
fund managers and active managers all derive business from 401(k) services, and
therefore have strong incentives to attract and retain such business from public
corporations.
In addition, many investment managers provide investment services to corporations, both to manage cash and short-term investments and also to manage the
long-term investments of financial corporations such as insurance companies. Investment managers may also provide investment management services to pension funds
that are sponsored by public corporations, and over which the corporation may
have some influence. US private sector pension funds had aggregate assets under
management of $2.9 trillion in 2015 (Investment Company Institute 2016). Several
empirical studies provide evidence suggesting that business ties with corporations
influence the voting decisions of investment managers. Davis and Kim (2007) find
that the volume of pension fund business of investment managers was associated
with those investment managers voting more often with corporate managers on
several key types of shareholder proposals. Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2012) find
that mutual fund families that have greater business ties to corporations tend to vote
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more favorably toward corporate managers on executive compensation matters at
all corporations.
These studies focus on the association between corporate business ties in
general and voting in corporations in general. Cvijanović, Dasgupta, and Zachariadis
(2016) examine contested shareholder proposals where corporate managers care
more about votes for their favored position, and find that mutual fund families
with business ties to a corporation are more likely to cast pro-management votes
in closely contested situations at the corporation. Although this study provides
evidence that an investment manager’s business ties with particular corporations
provide incentives to vote with corporate managers in close votes, there are clear
limits to the ability of investment managers to treat managers of client corporations
more favorably than their general voting policy would provide. Therefore, in our
view, the more important concern is that investment managers will have an incentive to lean in a pro-management direction when determining their strategies and
policies regarding stewardship.
Given the limited economic incentive that investment managers have to
generate governance gains in portfolio companies, and their strong economic
interest in attracting more business, choosing a pro-management approach within
the range of the legitimate choices available to them may seem the safest approach
to investment managers. Investment managers would have an incentive to take such
an approach as long as they believe that doing so might help them get additional
business from public corporations on an expected value basis.
Finally, we note certain additional private costs that are relevant only to the
largest investment managers and may contribute to discouraging these major
players from opposing corporate managers. Some mutual fund families hold close
to or above 5 percent of the stock in many public corporations. Indeed, the three
index fund managers that dominate the index fund sector—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street Global Advisors—hold such positions in most large publicly
traded corporations; Fidelity Investments and the Capital Group also hold such
positions in many public corporations, and Dimensional Fund Advisors holds
such positions in many smaller public corporations. Investment managers holding
such positions would bear additional private costs in the event that they attempt
to wield significant influence—and therefore have a significant incentive to avoid
doing so.
Under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934, investors that own or
control, in the aggregate, 5 percent or more of a corporation’s shares and that seek
to influence the control of the corporation are subject to extensive and repeated
disclosure requirements on Schedule 13D. Nominating directors, undertaking a
proxy contest for board representation, and other significant engagement action
would classify investment managers as seeking to influence control. By contrast,
investment managers that are not classified as seeking to influence control are
subject only to the relatively limited disclosure requirements on Schedule 13G.
Becoming subject to the substantial and repeated disclosure on Schedule 13D
would be very costly for the investment managers of major fund families, which
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typically manage multiple funds. Because the investment manager would have
to bear these costs itself rather than charge them to the investment funds, the
prospect of having to bear such costs provides additional incentives to avoid
taking any actions that might be classified as seeking to influence the control of
the corporation.

Activist Hedge Funds
Finally, we would like to discuss a different type of an investment manager,
the activist hedge fund manager. Applying the framework described above shows
why activist hedge fund managers suffer less from the agency problems that affect
investment managers with diversified equity portfolios, and why activist hedge fund
managers have incentives to make stewardship decisions that are significantly closer
to those that would be optimal for their beneficial investors.
Why Activist Hedge Funds are Different
Hedge funds managers limit their investment offerings to investors considered to be sophisticated, and are therefore not subject to the regulations governing
investment managers of mutual funds. Hedge funds therefore have considerably
more freedom in the assets they own, their use of leverage, and their compensation
structures. Our focus below is on the subset of hedge funds that take concentrated
positions in the equity of public corporations and actively engage with corporate
managers—activist hedge funds. For the reasons explained below, these hedge
funds have significant influence on the corporate governance landscape.
High-Powered Incentives to Increase Value. Hedge fund managers, including activist
hedge fund managers, typically receive compensation based on two components,
often referred to as “2 and 20” (French 2008): a management fee that is a relatively
small percentage of the value of the assets, historically 2 percent, and an incentive
payment, structured as a “carried interest” of a proportion (historically 20 percent)
of any increase in value of the portfolio.
Leaving aside the management fee, which is higher than the average for an
actively managed mutual fund but a similar order of magnitude, a hedge fund
manager that is able to increase the value of a position in a portfolio company
through investments in stewardship will capture 20 percent of this increase, an
order of magnitude more than the percentage of any value increase that a mutual
fund manager would be able to capture. Thus, activist hedge fund managers will
have much stronger incentives to bring about governance-generated increases in
value than investment managers of mutual funds, even when the latter hold positions with equal or greater dollar value.
Limited Business from Portfolio Companies. In contrast to mutual funds, which
are registered investment companies and publicly issue securities, hedge funds
are not registered investment companies and do not accept investments from 401(k)
plans. Accordingly, activist hedge fund managers do not have a desire to attract
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401(k) business that might discourage them from taking positions that corporate
managers disfavor. In addition, activist hedge funds do not offer other services to
corporations of the kind that many investment managers offer.
Concentrated Positions and Stronger Incentives Regarding Relative Performance.
Activist hedge funds have concentrated positions, sometimes holding significant
positions in as few as 10 portfolio companies. As a result, an improvement in the
value of a single portfolio company that is a target of stewardship activities can
substantially improve the fund manager’s performance relative to peer investment
vehicles. This will, in turn, affect the manager’s ability to attract additional investments. For example, the investment of Pershing Square Capital Management LP in
Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. and General Growth Properties Inc. each constituted
as much as one-fifth of the fund’s portfolio during certain periods, and the increase
in the value of these positions enabled the fund to post strong performance.
Because of their small size and method of selection, activist hedge fund portfolios
display very little correlation with those of competing funds, or with other investment
opportunities available to their investors. Any changes in the value of their portfolio
companies are therefore also clearly reflected in their relative performance against
such comparable investments. This factor therefore strengthens the incentive of
activist hedge fund managers to bring about governance-related improvements in the
value of their portfolio companies. Thus, the desire to improve relative performance
provides more powerful incentives for activist hedge funds to seek governance-related
value improvements than it does for managers of index funds and active mutual funds.
Clearly, the main factors that create a wedge between the interests of investment
managers and the beneficial investors whose investments they manage affects activist
hedge fund managers significantly less than investment managers of mutual funds.
Consistent with this, activist hedge fund managers are much more willing to devote
significant resources to stewardship. Activist hedge fund managers are often willing
to devote hundreds of person-hours per year to monitoring and engaging with each
of their portfolio companies. For instance, Pershing Square Capital Management
has an investment team of eight, plus several other employees, that oversee a portfolio of about 12 corporations (as reported in Krouse, Benoit, and McGinty 2016).
Activist hedge fund managers are also willing to have representatives on the board
of directors of portfolio companies, and often seek such representation. Such representation not only requires significant personnel time, but also imposes constraints
on the activist hedge fund manager’s trading in the portfolio company’s stock.
Furthermore, activist hedge fund managers frequently commence proxy contests
at portfolio companies (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008), despite the considerable expenses associated with such contests (estimated by Gantchev 2013 to average
about $10 million) and corporate managers’ views of such contests as adversarial.
By contrast, managers of mutual funds have generally avoided conducting proxy
contests at their portfolio companies, even where the mutual fund held a significant
stake. Even in situations where activist hedge fund managers do not conduct proxy
contests, they frequently take public positions that the managers of their portfolio
companies disfavor, which other investment managers generally avoid.
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Clearly activist hedge fund managers have different incentive structures that
enable them to play an important role in the current governance landscape. This
role is especially important in light of the significant agency problems that afflict
the stewardship decisions of mutual fund managers. But while activist hedge fund
managers play a beneficial role in the corporate governance system, there are significant limits to this beneficial role.
The Limits of Hedge Funds
Activist hedge fund managers have incentives to spend on stewardship only
when the governance-generated value increases likely to result are especially
large. The incentives of activist hedge fund managers are driven by the significant
performance-related fees that they earn, and by their concentrated portfolios. As a
result, activist hedge fund managers can pursue only those corporations where the
potential governance-related increases in value are sufficiently large that the funds’
investors can expect to make reasonable risk-adjusted returns after bearing the
high fees charged by the hedge fund managers and the firm-specific risks from the
funds’ concentrated portfolios. For example, where an activist hedge fund could
buy a stake in a given corporation and bring about a 3 percent increase in value
over a two-year period, the hedge fund manager would be unlikely to pursue this
opportunity.
This analysis is consistent with the fact that such funds usually focus on situations
where governance failures have led to substantial operating underperformance.
As a result, disclosures regarding the initiation of engagements by activist hedge
fund managers are accompanied by abnormal returns that, on average, exceed
5 percent, reflecting market expectations of a significant expected increase in value
(for example, Brav et al. 2008; Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang 2015).
Furthermore, for an activist hedge fund manager to bring about a governancegenerated increase in value, it is not only necessary that there be potential for such
a large increase, but also that other institutional investors are willing to support the
changes sought by the activist hedge fund manager. Activist hedge fund managers
are unable to bring about changes unless they obtain the support of other types
of institutional investors, or have a reasonable likelihood of doing so (Bebchuk
and Jackson 2012). When an activist hedge fund manager enjoys such support for
the changes it seeks, it will be able to win a proxy fight, or obtain a settlement
by credibly threatening to do so, and thereby cause the corporation to make such
changes. Conversely, when corporate managers expect that most institutional investors will side with them and not with activist hedge fund managers, activist hedge
fund managers will not have much influence.
Mutual fund managers do sometimes vote on the side of activist hedge fund
managers. Indeed, the expectation that this would be the case, and that activist
hedge funds could therefore prevail in potential proxy fights, often leads corporate managers to accept activist hedge funds’ demands for board representation
(Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch 2017). However, our analytical framework raises
the concern that, on the margin, mutual fund managers might not be sufficiently
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willing to support activist hedge fund managers in their engagements with portfolio companies where such support would be optimal for the mutual funds’
investors. Whether and to what extent this is the case is an interesting issue for
future research.
Finally, we should briefly note the issue of short-termism and long-termism.
Activist hedge fund managers have stronger incentives to bring about increases in
value than other institutional investors. However, some scholars have argued that
activist hedge fund managers focus on increases in short-term value and that the
increases they seek often come at the expense of long-term value (for example,
Strine 2014; Coffee and Palia 2015). One of us has addressed this claim in detail
elsewhere on both conceptual and empirical grounds (Bebchuk 2013; Bebchuk,
Brav, and Jiang 2015). Leaving aside the alleged distinction between short-term and
long-term increases in value, a key point of our analysis is that activist hedge fund
managers stand out relative to other institutional investors in terms of their incentives to seek increased value.
Of course, index funds are long-term players, and can therefore be expected
to favor only changes that would enhance value in the long term (for examples of
this view, see Lipton 2014, 2016). But our analysis shows that investment managers
overseeing index funds have very limited incentives to bring about governancegenerated increases in value, be they long-term or short-term.

Implications
The rise of institutional investors has transformed the governance landscape
facing the modern corporation. With shares concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, corporate managers no longer face diffuse shareholders that
are powerless to engage with managers. However, the agency problems of institutional investors prevent the full realization of the potential benefits of the increased
concentration of shareholdings. Investment managers overseeing diversified equity
portfolios have incentives to spend considerably less on stewardship, and to side
with corporate managers more frequently, than would be optimal for their beneficial investors. These factors operate to suppress investor stewardship relative to
optimal levels.
In this paper, we have provided a framework for analyzing these agency problems. We have also applied this framework to several key categories of investment
managers. Our analysis has significant implications for researchers and policymakers. While a full analysis of these implications is beyond the scope of this paper,
we outline ten of these implications below.
1. Research. Over recent decades, the amount of academic work analyzing
agency problems in corporate governance has increased dramatically (for example,
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 2013), but most of this work has examined the agency
problems of corporate insiders. We hope that our work will stimulate and provide a
framework for future work on the agency problems of institutional investors.
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2. Disclosure. Public awareness and academic research about the agency problems of managers of publicly traded corporations is facilitated by the extensive
disclosures made by such corporations about internal decisions. Policymakers may
wish to consider adopting regulations that would require investment managers to
disclose information that would enable investors and others to identify and assess
agency problems. For example, investment managers of mutual funds have been
required to disclose how they vote their shares in publicly traded corporations since
2004, but some other investment managers are not required to do so. Furthermore,
policymakers may want to consider tighter disclosure requirements that would
provide comprehensive information about the business ties between investment
managers and the public corporations in which they invest.
3. Regulation of Mutual Fund Fees. Regulations that preclude key investment
managers from charging stewardship expenses to their investment funds, or from
tying fees to increases in the value of their portfolios, have significant effects on
the stewardship decisions of these investment managers. These regulations might
be justified to protect the beneficial investors in these investment funds. However,
policymakers should recognize the tradeoffs created by these rules, and consider
whether some adjustments may be warranted.
4. Stewardship Codes. In a number of countries, such as the United Kingdom
(Financial Reporting Council 2012), Japan (Council of Experts Concerning
the Japanese Version of the Stewardship Code 2014), and Canada (Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2013), concerns about whether
institutional investors undertake adequate stewardship have led to the development of nonbinding stewardships codes which various institutional investors have
pledged to follow. Our analysis suggests that there is a problem with the incentives
of institutional investors to spend on stewardship. To the extent that this is the case,
stewardship codes putting forward aspirations, principles, or guidelines are likely
to have less of an impact than if investment managers had appropriate incentives.
5. Index Investing. The rise of index investing has generally been viewed as a
positive development because it has reduced the cost of investment intermediation.
Our analysis shows that a continuation of this trend could have significant costs for
corporate governance. This analysis also highlights the challenges likely to result if
index funds continue to grow as expected.
6. Anticompetitive Effects of Index Investing. Recent work has raised concerns that,
because index funds are invested across various corporations in an economic sector,
they would have incentives to encourage those corporations to engage in anticompetitive behavior that would enable them to capture monopolistic rents, (for
example, Elhauge 2016; Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl 2016).4 This line of work is
based on the premise that index fund managers have strong incentives to take whatever actions would maximize the collective wealth of their beneficial investors. Our
analysis indicates that index fund managers might well have different incentives,
4

These arguments build on empirical studies by Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2017) and Azar, Raina, and
Schmalz (2016), although these studies have recently been questioned by Rock and Rubinfeld (2017).
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which would lead them to limit intervention with their portfolio companies. Thus,
our analysis suggests that it is implausible to expect that index fund managers would
seek to facilitate significant anticompetitive behavior.
7. Proxy Advisors. Institutional investors commonly employ the services of one
or more proxy advisors, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, which analyze voting choices
faced by investors in public corporations and make recommendations (Malenko
and Shen 2016). Critics of proxy advisors would prefer that institutional investors
reduce their reliance on the analysis and recommendations provided by proxy
advisors (Clark and Van Buren 2013). Indeed, legislation currently being considered by Congress (previously titled the Proxy Advisory Firm Reform Act of 2016)
would regulate proxy advisors in ways that might significantly increase their costs of
operation and otherwise discourage their activities. Our analysis raises a concern
that a reduction in the activities of proxy advisors would not be offset by increased
spending on analysis by institutional investors sufficient to maintain even their
current levels of monitoring.
8. Hedge Fund Activism. There is a heated debate over the role of hedge fund
activism. Whereas some writers, including one of us, have been supportive of such
activism (for example, Bebchuk and Jackson 2012; Bebchuk 2013; Bebchuk, Brav,
and Jiang 2015; Gilson and Gordon 2013), others view it as counterproductive
and advocate various measures that would limit and discourage such activism (for
example, Strine 2014; Coffee and Palia 2015). Some prominent critics of hedge
fund activism would like to see the engagement currently conducted by activist
hedge fund managers replaced by the stewardship of institutional investors. Our
analysis shows the important role that activist hedge fund managers play in the
corporate governance landscape. Because the incentives of mutual fund managers
differ substantially from those of activist hedge fund managers, were the abilities
of hedge funds to undertake such engagement to be impeded, stewardship by
mutual fund managers would be unlikely to replace activist hedge fund managers
in constraining agency problems in public corporations.
9. Wolf Packs. When an activist hedge fund takes a position in an underperforming public corporation, other hedge funds often acquire positions in the
corporation (Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews 2016). Groups of such “follower” hedge
funds are commonly referred to as “wolf packs,” and various writers have suggested
that they are a negative influence (for example, Coffee and Palia 2015). Our analysis,
however, indicates that so-called wolf packs might serve a useful purpose. Because
mutual funds might be reluctant to vote against incumbents, an activist hedge fund
might sometimes be unable to win a proxy fight against underperforming incumbents when such victory would be in the interests of investors. By contrast, when a
dispute between incumbents and an activist hedge fund draws other hedge funds
to invest, the new shareholders are more willing to also invest in assessing which
course of action would be optimal and to vote accordingly, including voting against
the incumbents if they conclude it to be value-enhancing.
10. Shareholder Rights. For some critics of shareholder rights (Bainbridge
2006, for example), the imperfections of institutional investors, and the fact that
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stewardship decisions are taken by agents rather than the ultimate beneficial investors, provide a rationale for weakening shareholder rights and insulating corporate
managers from shareholder action. Given that the agents may not be acting in the
interests of beneficial investors, so the argument goes, there is reason to limit the
power of the tools given to those agents lest they use the tools in ways that are counterproductive to the interests of their beneficial investors. However, our analysis of
the agency problems of institutional investors identifies a clear direction in which
their stewardship decisions deviate from those that are optimal for their beneficial
investors: investment managers can be expected to underutilize the tools they have
to engage with corporate managers.
Thus, notwithstanding the imperfections of investment managers as agents for
their beneficial investors, there is little basis for concerns that institutional investors
will interfere excessively with the actions of corporate managers. Accordingly, there
is no reason to weaken shareholder rights or impede shareholder action based on
such concerns. An understanding of the agency problems of institutional investors
leads to the conclusion that modern corporations do not suffer from too much
shareholder intervention, but rather from too little.
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